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When predicting future emotions, i.e. engaging in affective forecasting, people tend to 
overestimate the intensity and duration of emotions, termed the impact bias. We investigated 
the intensity component of affective forecasts, exploring how a student sample (N = 108) 
predicted the intensity of their own future (un)happiness following an excellent and a poor 
exam grade. First, we addressed whether impact bias might serve a motivational purpose, by 
exploring whether individual differences in achievement motivation predicts forecasted 
intensity. Moreover, we tested the effect of an attentional focusing manipulation for a poor or 
good exam grade, and whether achievement motivation moderated the focusing effect. 
Individual differences in mastery needs were related to the intensity of forecasted emotions. 
Performance needs were unrelated to forecasts. The focusing manipulation caused a slight 
reduction in forecasted intensity for a poor grade, but did not influence forecasts for an 
excellent grade. No moderation effect was found. 
 
Keywords: 
affective forecasting, need for achievement, focalism, achievement goal, impact bias 
         
  




Når man forutser fremtidige følelser, eller lager “affective forecasts”, har man en 
tendens til å overestimere følelsens intensitet og varighet, kjent som “impact bias”. Vi 
undersøkte intensitetskomponenten av “affective forecasts” ved å utforske hvordan et 
studentutvalg (N=108) foutså intensiteten i egen fremtidig (u)lykke etter en svært god eller 
svært dårlig eksamenskarakter. Først adresserte vi hvorvidt “impact bias” kan ha en 
motivasjonell funksjon ved å utforske hvorvidt individuelle forskjeller i “achievement”-
motivasjon predikerer forutsett intensitet. Videre testet vi effekten av en 
oppmerksomhetsfokuserende manipulasjon ved en god eller dårlig karakter, og hvorvidt 
“achievement”-motivasjon modererte effekten av fokuseringen. Individuelle forskjeller i 
mestringsbehov var relatert til intensiteten i forutsette følelser. Prestasjonsbehov var urelatert 
til “forecasts”. Fokuseringsmanipulasjonen forårsaket en liten reduksjon i forutsett intensitet 
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Affective Forecasting and Need for Achievement: The Intense Emotion of Mastery 
Needs and the Features of Focalism 
Humans frequently make decisions based on the emotional consequences we believe 
our actions will have. Both trivial and more important choices are informed by these 
expectations, from deciding how hard to study for an exam, to whom to marry. Gilbert and 
Wilson (e.g. 2009) developed the theory of affective forecasting which attempts to explain 
how people make these predictions. According to Gilbert and Wilson (2009), people first 
create a simulation of the event, a preview. They then experience an emotional reaction to 
this preview, a premotion (from “pre-emotion”). Predictions of future emotions, affective 
forecasts, are based on this premotion. 
Affective forecasts are not always as accurate as people think they are. Research has 
shown that most people show an impact bias: they tend to predict that their emotional 
reactions will be more intense and longer lasting than they actually are (Gilbert, Driver-Linn, 
& Wilson, 2002, p. 116).  
The present study examined whether individual differences in motivational 
orientation could make some people more prone to impact bias, and we discuss the possible 
adaptive function of the bias. In addition, we explored how event consistent information, 
working memory depletion, and construal level could increase or decrease the bias. The study 
was developed based on the theoretical framework by Gilbert and Wilson (2009). 
Methodology was inspired by previous studies that have examined individual differences in 
affective forecasting (e.g. Hoerger, Quirk, Lucas, & Carr, 2010), and studies that have 
successfully reduced impact bias through experimental manipulation (e.g. Wilson, Wheatley, 
Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). The impact bias has previously been reduced using 
specific interventions, and we used a manipulation that could potentially differentiate 
between the effective and redundant components of these interventions. The paper begins by 
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introducing existing research in the affective forecasting field. We start by describing the 
mechanisms theorized to be involved in affective forecasting, and go on to describe the link 
between motivation and affective forecasting. 
Affective Forecasting 
According to Wilson and Gilbert (2003), people make predictions of emotional 
valence and specific emotion, in addition to emotional duration and intensity. People are 
fairly accurate when predicting valence and specific emotion in simple scenarios, and the 
impact bias only describes the failure to accurately predict intensity and duration (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003). The bias has been demonstrated for a range of both positive and negative 
events, from failing an exam to winning the lottery (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Wilson & 
Gilbert 2003). In this field, making accurate affective forecasts is presumed to be dependent 
on having the cognitive ability to accurately create previews of the future. In turn, forecasting 
requires the emotional awareness to accurately recognize and make predictions based on 
premotions (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009). People have been shown to have sufficient cognitive 
and emotional capacity to predict whether they will feel good or bad, and whether the “good” 
will be happy, or maybe proud or amused. The intensity of the happy feeling and how long 
the feeling will last is more subject to error.  
Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert (2001) suggest that three cognitive tasks are involved 
when creating previews, and that failure at any one of these may lead to impact bias. First, 
past experiences must be compared to the prospective experience. How alike is the 
experience of mastering a new skill to the experience of getting a good grade on an exam? 
Second, people must evaluate which of their previous experiences are relevant. When 
forecasting reactions to getting an A on a physiology exam, are the emotions experienced 
when winning a game of luck relevant? Third, when completing the two first tasks, people 
must also be able to accurately recall how they have previously felt. Was it happiness, or 
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maybe pride? If it was happiness; how much happiness exactly? Several sources of error have 
been found related to these tasks. Memories can be colored by current attitudes, beliefs, and 
personal goals, and people remember only parts of their emotional experiences. What they do 
remember is often remembered in abstract terms (Aaker, Drolet, & Griffin, 2008). 
Additionally, as the perceived psychological distance to an event increases, people tend to 
think in more abstract and decontextualized terms (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). 
Arguably, if important details of an event or the context are ignored, this may mean neither 
past nor future events are accurately represented, causing forecasting errors. Based on these 
and similar findings, Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg and Wheatley (1998) proposed six 
potential reasons for biased forecasts. In the present study we chose to focus on two of these, 
motivated distortions and focalism. Bias may be motivated by a desire to experience the 
immediate premotion. A biased forecast may also be a way to motivate oneself in order to 
accomplish or avoid the focal event. Focalism in turn can be summarized as the tendency for 
people to focus exclusively on the target event. They then fail to correct for the impact other 
events will have on their emotions.  
Specifically, we examined how motivational achievement goals relate to forecasts 
about achievement events, and how forecasts could be affected by an attempt to focus 
attention toward specific aspects of the future. Despite previous interest in a connection 
between motivational goals and affective forecasts (Hoover, 2012; Sheldon, Gunz, Nichols, 
& Ferguson, 2010), specific achievement goals have not been the focus of affective 
forecasting studies prior to the current investigation. Knowledge about affective forecasting 
and the impact bias could in principle be practically applied, for example in clinical work 
with patients who pathologically under- or overestimate the intensity and/or duration of their 
future emotions. However, before knowledge about the impact bias and bias reduction can be 
practically applied, we need to know more about the situations in which biased forecasting 
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may be adaptive, as well as situations where it could be harmful. It may also be more 
prevalent, and/or more adaptive for particular individuals. In addition, if one aims to reduce 
or increase the bias, we need to know more about not just which interventions work, but how 
they work. The present study was an attempt to start answering these questions.  
 Focal emotion. To start, we had to choose which specific emotions to measure. One 
of the most fundamental distinctions in models of emotion has traditionally been whether an 
emotion is valenced as positive or negative (Watson & Clark, 1994). The intensity of the 
affective experience and the frequency of positive versus negative affect appear to be what 
determines if an experience is “happy” or “unhappy” (Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 
1985). Affective forecasting research has also focused on the intensity and duration of 
anticipated (un)happiness in relation to future events (e.g. Ayton, Pott, & Elwakili, 2007; 
Morewedge & Buechel, 2013; Wilson et al., 2000). Specific emotions such as regret 
(Sevdalis & Harvey, 2009) and vengefulness (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008) have also 
been studied in affective forecasting research, and specific emotions such as surprise, pride, 
self-efficacy, shame, fear, and embarrassment may arguably be important in achievement 
situations. However, we chose happiness and unhappiness, as we theorized that specific 
emotional states would be encompassed by this more fundamental distinction. Currently, 
“(un)happiness” is most often conceptualized as an enduring experience of positive or 
negative affect (Quoi Bach, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2015). In the present study we focus more 
on immediate emotional reactions, rather than happiness as an enduring state. We also chose 
to focus on the intensity dimension, as this has been found to be an apt descriptor how 
“good” or “bad” an emotional experience is judged to be (Diener et al., 1985). High intensity 
has been associated with specific emotions such as exuberance or depression, while low 
intensity is more associated with contentment or mild unhappiness (Diener et al., 1985). We 
wanted to determine whether people with different motivational goals have a tendency to 
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predict either low or high intensity (un)happiness when imagining achieving a future goal, or 
experiencing a failure. We also investigated whether the intensity of forecasted happiness 
could be manipulated experimentally. 
Motivation 
One of the main arguments for studying affective forecasting is the role forecasts 
appear to play in motivation (Buehler, McFarland, Spyropoulos, & Lam, 2007). According to 
Gilbert et al. (1998), affective forecasts are the “[...]guiding star by which people chart their 
life courses[...]” (p.617). We defined motivation as an experienced general sense of drive, 
being caused by a prospective end state. Attribution theories of motivation claim that what 
motivates people is not the actual end state, but rather their interpretation of the end state 
(Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). We proposed that this interpretation can be described as an 
affective forecast, consisting of a specific previewed result and the premotions associated 
with it, which in turn may lead to a sense of motivation. A person can be motivated to attain a 
desirable event or avoid an undesirable event, and an event can be neutral, causing no 
motivation.  
In our study, the previewed result was an exam grade. The actual underlying goal may 
be more general, such as “doing well in school”, or “being smart”. The level of happiness 
experienced in response to the preview then leads to a forecast of future happiness (Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2009), possibly causing a motivated drive to attain or avoid the grade. That is, how 
you expect to feel about reaching a future goal can determine how much effort you are 
willing to exert to make it happen. 
Motivational consequences of biased forecasts. Two views regarding the 
consequences of the impact bias are apparent in the literature. Hoover (2012) and Hoerger et 
al. (2010) have argued that bias should be reduced. They claim that biased forecasts can 
cause unnecessary anxiety, disappointment, and excessive effort being expended in the 
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pursuit of fruitless goals. However, most biases and heuristics studied in psychology are 
extreme cases of generally useful decision making strategies (Gigerenzer, 2008), and this 
could also be the case for the impact bias. Wilson and Gilbert (2005) have suggested that bias 
could cause increased experienced motivation. They argued that people will work harder to 
attain or avoid an outcome when they overestimate the longevity and intensity of the 
emotional consequences this will have. Subjective well-being has been shown to be largely 
stable over time, and even uncommon events do not substantially affect long-term happiness 
(Gilbert et al., 1998). Biased forecasts may thus be more motivating than accurate forecasts 
that tell you that your happiness will stay pretty equal either way (Gilbert et al., 1998). 
Morewedge and Buechel (2013) explored the motivational and behavioral benefits of 
the impact bias. They found that people made more extreme forecasts after committing to a 
future event, compared to when they were still deciding. The authors hypothesized that when 
still deciding, people try to perform impartial cost-benefit analyses. Once decided, they move 
into an implemental mindset where they focus on achieving the end state. Morewedge and 
Buechel (2013) also found that people’s forecasts are more biased when they believe they can 
influence an event. In other words, if you don’t believe your actions can have an effect, there 
is no reason to produce more intense and therefore more motivating forecasts. Finally, when 
the intensity of forecasts was increased experimentally, more intense forecasts resulted in 
participants working harder, demonstrating that forecasts influence not just experienced 
motivation, but motivated behavior.  
Need for achievement. Many studies on motivation have concerned individual 
differences. A portion of these have concerned individual differences in need for achievement 
(Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Need for achievement has been defined as the drive to overcome 
obstacles and “do something difficult as well and as quickly as possible” (Murray, 1955, p. 
64). According to Elliot and McGregor (2001), need for achievement can be divided into two 
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subcategories, which in this paper will be referred to as performance and mastery needs. The 
categories differ in how an achievement result is evaluated. Performance refers to evaluating 
one’s achievements relative to others, also referred to as competitiveness, or ego-involved 
goals. Mastery refers to evaluating results relative to absolute or intrapersonal standards. 
Standards are informed by the requirements of the task, as well as previous achievements, or 
the highest achievement possible. Mastery can also be referred to as work-mastery, learning, 
or task-involved goals. (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Spence & 
Helmreich, 1983). Elliot and McGregor (2001) conceptualized mastery and performance 
needs as being valenced as either approach, with a focus on winning or mastering, or 
avoidance, with a focus on loss or non-mastery. Approachers have been shown to be more 
oriented toward positive events, and avoiders toward negative events (Elliot, 2006). Mastery 
needs have previously been associated with several types of achievements, including 
academic success. Performance needs, in particular performance avoidance, have been found 
to be uncorrelated and even negatively correlated with achievement results (Helmreich, 
Beane, Lucker, & Spence, 1978; Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010; 
Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002; Payne, Youngcourt, & Beaubien, 2007). 
The need for achievement hypothesis. Several studies have previously examined the 
various associations between achievement goals, affective forecasts, effort, and success. 
Morewedge and Buechel (2013) found that a global measure of need for achievement 
positively correlated with bias in forecasted happiness for winning a game of skill. They also 
found that participants with more extreme forecasts spent more time working toward an 
achievement goal (Morewedge & Buechel, 2013). Another study found that participants with 
more biased forecasts demonstrated greater success at several laboratory tasks (Hoover, 
2012). It seems likely that extreme forecasts lead to effortful work, which in turn results in 
higher academic achievement. 
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 However, need for achievement is not a unidimensional construct, and the effect of 
forecasts on effort might work differently for different achievement goals. Actual emotional 
reactions to achieving success through hard work appears to be mediated by achievement 
orientation. Mastery oriented children report that expending effort leads to more satisfaction, 
and that low-effort successes lead to boredom and unhappiness. Conversely, children high in 
performance needs have been shown to associate effort with low ability, and mere effort, 
even if it leads to success, can cause unhappiness (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). These 
interpretations of effort appear to have an effect on future achievement behavior. Fisher and 
Ford (1998) found that mastery oriented participants spent more time working towards a 
goal, and used more work-intensive strategies than performance oriented participants. In 
addition, people who are focused on performance have been shown to primarily attempt tasks 
they know they can successfully complete, while mastery is associated with choosing more 
challenging tasks (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). When including impact bias, the association 
between goals and effort becomes more complicated. Hoover (2012) found that participants 
who highly valued mastering laboratory tasks had less biased forecasts. She suggested bias 
may be more prominent for real-world events that presumably are more important to 
participants, and suggested measuring need for achievement and exam grades in affective 
forecasting studies (Hoover 2012).  
The present study did just that, and examined how specific achievement goals were 
associated with students forecasted happiness if they got an F or an A on a future exam. If 
impact bias is not adaptive, there would be no reason for an association between specific 
goals and forecasts. As mainly mastery needs have been associated with achievement, we 
predicted that mastery needs alone would be associated with affective forecasts. This would 
support the theory that affective forecasts form the bridge between achievement needs and 
academic performance. We also anticipated that approach motives in general would be more 
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strongly associated with forecasts in the positive scenario (A), and avoid motives in the 
negative scenario (F). 
Focalism 
Gilbert et al. (1998) suggested that focalism, an excessively narrow attentional focus 
when making forecasts, can cause impact bias. They claimed that by focusing on a future 
event in isolation, people ignore other aspects of their lives that also influence their emotional 
state. The effect of focalism on people’s forecasts has been experimentally demonstrated by 
Wilson et al. (2000), who manipulated participants forecasts though a defocusing 
manipulation: Before making forecasts, participants in the experimental condition were asked 
to rate how much time they would spend on a variety of daily activities, and also made a list 
of self-generated activities. When participants subsequently rated their experienced happiness 
after the focal event took place, the experimental condition had less biased forecasts.  
Several researchers have proposed explanations for how defocusing manipulations 
reduce bias. Wilson et al. (2000) proposed the distraction hypothesis, which states that 
defocusing works by making people remember that other events also influence their 
emotional states. People should therefore report spending less time thinking about the focal 
event after a defocusing intervention. However, Sevdalis and Harvey (2009) found that 
participants rated emotions as less intense after both writing a diary and solving anagrams, 
and proposed the interference hypothesis. This states that working memory is required for the 
process that makes biased forecasts, and both anagrams and diaries reduce bias by depleting 
working memory. Ayton et al. (2007) proposed a third explanation, referred to as the 
construal-level hypothesis, stating that defocusing causes people to move from thinking in 
high-level construals to low-level construals, i.e. using a less abstract and more 
contextualized mindset, which causes bias reduction.  
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The focalism hypothesis. The distraction, interference and construal level hypotheses 
thus nominate three different components necessary for defocusing. It remains unclear 
whether the components interact to cause a bias reduction, or if a sole component is 
responsible for the defocusing effect. We designed one manipulation that enabled us to test 
all three hypotheses, described more closely in the method section. If the manipulation 
increased the intensity of forecasts, this would support the distraction hypothesis, as the 
content of the manipulation was related to the focal event (exam grades). If the manipulation 
had no effect on forecasts, this would support the interference hypothesis, as the manipulation 
should minimally tax working memory. If the manipulation decreased intensity, this would 
support the construal-level hypothesis, as the manipulation used low-level construal 
language.  
The Moderation Hypothesis 
We also investigated whether need for achievement affected how sensitive an 
individual was to the manipulation. A connection between event-importance and impact bias 
has previously been established, where forecasts were more biased for events that were 
considered more important (Hoerger et al., 2010). We reasoned that achievement goals would 
be a good proxy for individual differences in event importance, as events related to personal 
goals (i.e. exam grades and achievement goals) could arguably be more important to an 
individual than events not related to personal goals. Studies have also shown that there is a 
positive correlation between event importance and performance on memory tasks, but that 
this correlation is mediated by attention (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001). If 
attention is not allocated to a task, the importance of the task has no effect on performance. 
Thus we hypothesized that the forecasts of participants generally high in need for 
achievement would be more sensitive to manipulations of attention, under the assumption 
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that achievement goals influence the degree of event importance. We therefore expected a 
moderation effect if the manipulation successfully affected attentional focus.  
Summary: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The present study was designed to answer three different research questions 
(graphically represented in Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the three hypotheses examined in the present study. 
 
First, how do affective forecasts relate to mastery and performance aspects of need for 
achievement? We hypothesized that mastery needs, but not performance needs, would predict 
the intensity of the happiness/unhappiness participants believe they would feel if they got an 
F/A on a future exam. This will be referred to as the need for achievement hypothesis. 
Second, can we increase the impact bias, and what does experimentally manipulating 
forecasts tell us about how focalism functions? The focalism hypothesis had three separate 
stipulations, depending on how the manipulation affected forecasts. Third, does higher levels 
of need for achievement make people more susceptible to manipulations of forecasts? We 
predicted that need for achievement would moderate the effect of the manipulation, 
particularly if the manipulation affects attentional focus, henceforth referred to as the 
moderation hypothesis. 
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We designed a questionnaire-based experiment with a between-subjects design and 
two conditions to test the hypotheses. Our sample consisted of students, who were asked to 
forecast their happiness in response to given exam grades. All participants self-reported their 
need for achievement, and participants were randomly assigned to either a focalism condition 
or a control condition.  
Methods 
Participants 
108 participants (76 women, Mage = 21.45, SDage = 2.33) were randomly assigned 
either the focalism condition, or the control condition. We used convenience sampling of a 
specific target population; medical, dentistry, or law students at the University of Bergen. 
Participants were recruited immediately after a joint lecture for medical and dentistry 
students1, and three different lectures for law students2. Law students constituted a majority 
of the sample (71.3 %), followed by medical (23.1 %) and dentistry students (5.6 %). 
Conditions were matched with respects to gender, age, and course. Women were 
overrepresented in our sample, but are also overrepresented in the target population 
(Database for statistikk om høgre utdanning, 2016a, 2016b). Participants were offered a gift 
card with a value of 33 NOK as compensation for their time. 
Procedure 
The study was described in the questionnaire as “part of a study of personality, 
attitudes, and decisions”. The text informed participants they could withdraw at any time, and 
participants gave a written indication of consent. The questionnaire was filled out in the 
auditorium and took approximately 15 minutes. Participants were instructed not to 
communicate. Hypotheses were not disclosed in order to avoid bias as a result of demand 
                                                 
1 MEDOD1: "Første semester medisin- og odontologistudiet" 
2 JUS111: "Forvaltningsrett I", JUS112: "Arve- og familierett", og JUS123 "Kontraktsrett II". 
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characteristics (Orne, 2009). A verbal debrief was planned upon completion of the 
questionnaire, but proved problematic as participants finished at different times and left the 
auditorium. However, experimenters were available if participants had questions or concerns. 
No identifying information was gathered, and the risk of harm was judged to be minimal, and 
no ethical clearances were deemed necessary.  
For both conditions, the questionnaire started with demographic questions, followed 
by measures of need for achievement: Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire, and 
Achievement Goal Questionnaire (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Spence & Helmreich, 1983). As 
both need for achievement measures focus on performance we ran the risk that they would 
affect forecasts (Schwarz, 1999). To reduce the effect of these measures we added a 
Norwegian translation of the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Jones, 
2011) as a filler task before the actual manipulation. The intention was to focus participants’ 
attention on their present mood, rather than possible future achievements, and to decrease the 
transparency of the study to avoid hypothesis guessing.  
All participants were then instructed to “picture the following scenario as vividly as 
possible”, and subsequently asked to imagine that the exam for the class they had just 
attended had “gone so poorly that you received an F” (the F-scenario). In the focalism 
condition this was followed by a short, emotionally neutral text designed to enhance the focus 
on academic achievement, which included a reference to two lectures, reading in a study hall, 
discussing the grade with classmates, and a study group for a different exam (See Appendix 
E for complete focalism questionnaire). We used low-level construal language to make the 
manipulation comparable with previous defocusing manipulations (e.g. Wilson et al., 2000). 
The manipulation was administered passively, i.e. through a text to be read, which should tax 
working memory less than actively generating content. Participants in the control condition 
were simply asked to imagine receiving the grade, and received no accompanying text. 
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Participants in both scenarios then forecasted the intensity of their happiness should they 
receive an A (the A-scenario). Due to an error the focusing text was not included in the A-
scenario. As the focusing text in the F-scenario was written on the page immediately 
preceding the A-scenario, we nevertheless expected an effect, though it may be smaller than 
in the F-scenario. 
Actual emotional reactions were not assessed, so we cannot determine whether the 
forecasts were in fact biased. However, the intensity of forecasts functioned as a proxy for the 
impact bias, under the assumption that more intense forecasts are more biased as well. 
Measures3 
Need for achievement. The need for achievement measures were translated from 
English to Norwegian, see Appendix A for more information about translation and validity. 
Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire. The Work and Family Orientation 
Questionnaire (WOFO) is a 19-item questionnaire designed to measure general achievement 
motives. The WOFO can been divided into a work-mastery component (14 items), and a five 
item competition component (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Gregor & O'Brien, 2015; Spence & 
Helmreich, 1983). The present study used a seven-point scale with the anchors “Not at all 
true of me” and “Very true of me”. Two items were deleted from the work-mastery subscale 
post hoc due to low item-total correlation (.027 and .172), leaving one 12 item work-mastery 
scale with α = .762 (e.g. “I like hard work”), and the five item competitiveness scale (e.g. “I 
feel that winning is important in both work and games” [Spence & Helmreich, 1983, p. 42], 
scale α = .884).  
Achievement Goal Questionnaire. The Achievement Goal Questionnaire (AGQ) is a 
12-item measure designed to measure the need to achieve based on a 2 x 2 Achievement Goal 
                                                 
3 A measure of expected effort leading up to the exam was excluded from analysis as participants had varying 
time left until their exam, and as such their responses were not comparable. 
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Framework (Elliot & McGregor, 2001). We used a seven-point Likert scale with the anchors 
“Not at all true of me” and “Very true of me”. The AGQ has four 3-item factors; 
performance approach (e.g. “It is important for me to do better than other students”, scale 
α=.893), mastery avoidance (e.g. “I worry that I may not learn all I possibly could in this 
class”, scale α=.899), mastery approach (e.g. “It is important for me to understand the 
content of this course as thoroughly as possible”, scale α=.753), and performance avoidance 
(e.g. “My goal in this class is to avoid performing poorly”, scale α=.830; Elliot & McGregor, 
2001, p. 504). The AGQ is targeted to a specific course, and participants were instructed to 
consider the lecture they had just attended while completing the measure. Targeted measures 
have previously been used when studying task motivation and affective forecasting (Hoover, 
2012), and may be a better predictor of forecasts than the more general WOFO.  
Happiness forecasts. In both scenarios participants were asked to predict the 
intensity4 of their happiness on the day they received their grade (the dependent variable) on a 
scale of 0 (“Very unhappy”) to 10 (“Very happy”). Assessing anticipated happiness in this 
manner is the norm in the field (e.g. Ayton et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 1998; Hoerger et al., 
2010; Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2013; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013; Wilson et al., 
2000), and this measure was shown by Gilbert et al. (1998) to have good concurrent validity 
when compared to two multi-item measures of life satisfaction.  
Manipulation check. Whether the manipulation caused an increase in attentional 
focus was examined by asking participants to indicate “how much time will you spend 
thinking about your grade that day?” on a scale of 0 (“Very little”) to 10 (“Very much”). This 
is a typical manipulation check in articles based on the distraction paradigm (e.g. Wilson et 
al., 2000), where the manipulation is considered successful if participants in the defocusing 
                                                 
4 Forecasted duration of affect was measured, but not analyzed in the present study. 
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condition score lower than controls. For a successful manipulation of attention in the current 
study, participants in the focalism condition should score higher than control on this measure. 
Statistical Analyses 
Analyses were conducted with IBM SPSS version 23, and conducted separately for 
the F-scenario and the A-scenario. As samples must be approximately normally distributed in 
order to use many commonly used statistical tests (e.g. t-test, ANOVA, and Pearson's 
correlation), the Shapiro-Wilk-test was used to assess the distribution of the major study 
variables, and significantly nonnormal variables investigated (Blanca, Arnau, López-Montiel, 
Bono, & Bendayan, 2013). Cutoff for acceptable normality was set at skewness and kurtosis 
greater than ±1.96 when divided by their standard error (Rose, Spinks, & Canhoto, 2014). 
Significantly nonnormal distributions for several variables were uncovered (see Appendix C 
for table of descriptives and normality tests). We therefore chose OLS regression to test all 
our hypotheses, where only the normal distribution of residuals is necessary. Regression is 
also more sensitive than many nonparametric tests (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). To 
test the moderation hypothesis, we performed moderated OLS regressions using Hayes’ 
(2013) PROCESS macro. Demographic variables (gender, age, course) were controlled for in 
all regressions. The effect of the manipulation on attention was assessed with a Mann-
Whitney U-test, a nonparametric alternative to the t-test. See Appendix C for evaluations of 
statistical assumptions5. 
Outliers were identified and treated separately for each regression6. There were no 
dropouts, and missing data were imputed (see Appendix B). 
 
 
                                                 
5 Multiple regression was supplemented by nonparametric tests in the case of unmet statistical assumptions. 
6 No outliers were excluded for non-parametric tests 




Normality Tests  
All of the major study variables except the WOFO scales and AGQ performance 
approach were significantly nonnormal. In addition, forecasts in the A-scenario, both 
manipulation checks, and the AGQ mastery approach subscale showed marked restriction of 
range. We defined marked restriction of range as scores one standard deviation on either side 
of the mean falling outside the range of possible responses on the scale. Mild range 
restriction (scores 2 SD from M falling outside the scale) was also found for forecasts in the 
F-scenario and all need for achievement variables except WOFO work-mastery (see 
Appendix C for distribution statistics).  
The Need for Achievement Hypothesis 
The results confirmed the hypothesis that higher mastery needs, but not performance 
needs, predicted more intense forecasted (un)happiness in response to exam grades. 
After excluding two outliers in the F-scenario (see Appendix B), multiple regression 
was conducted with N = 106 in the F-scenario and N = 108 in the A-scenario. See Table 1 for 
predictor coefficients. Adjusted R2 signifies the effect size for the total model. As the 
predictor variables were intercorrelated (see Appendix A for coefficients), significance and 
effect size for specific predictors were determined by examining the structure coefficient (rs) 
and the semi partial correlation coefficient (sr), in addition to standardized beta (ß). When rs 
is significant but ß and sr are not, this indicates that the predictor has explanatory value, but 
that this value is shared with other predictors due to multicollinearity (Stellefson, Hanik, 
Chaney, & Chaney, 2008).  
Participants who scored higher on mastery needs forecasted more intense unhappiness 
in the F-scenario (F (7,98) = 3.843, p = .001, adj. R2 = .159), in line with the need for 
achievement hypothesis. All significant correlations were negative (see Table 2), and AGQ 
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mastery avoidance was the strongest predictor. This means that participants who reported 
more anxiety about not learning as much as they could, also anticipated more unhappiness if 
they should receive an F on the exam. AGQ mastery avoidance accounted for nearly all the 
variance explained by the model. No other variables had significant unique contributions. No 
coefficients were significant for AGQ performance approach, and it alone was totally 
unrelated to forecasted unhappiness. Including demographic variables did not lead to an 
increase in the model’s overall predictive power (all R2 change p < .413). 
Participants who scored higher on mastery needs forecasted more intense happiness in 
the A-scenario (F (7,100) = 5.005, p < .001, adj. R2 = .208), also supporting the need for 
achievement hypothesis. All significant correlations were positive, and all three mastery 
subscales were substantial predictors. This means that participants predicted greater 
happiness at receiving an A on the exam if they also reported they liked to work hard, valued 
understanding the content of the class, and were anxious about not learning as much as they 
could. WOFO work-mastery, AGQ mastery approach, and AGQ mastery avoidance 
explained proportionate amounts of the variance, but only the first two had significant unique 
contributions. AGQ performance approach and WOFO competitiveness were completely 
unrelated to anticipated happiness. Including demographic variables did not lead to an 
increase in the model’s overall predictive power (all R2 change p < .126). Not all statistical 
assumptions were met in the A-scenario, however, supplemental nonparametric analyses 
resulted in similar findings (see Appendix C for assumptions and Appendix D for 
nonparametric results).  
In sum, we found a significant relationship between AGQ mastery avoidance and 
forecasted intensity if participants failed their exam. We also found a relationship between 
forecasted intensity and AGQ mastery approach, AGQ mastery avoidance, and WOFO work- 
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Total model - - - 15,9 % - - - - 20,8 % -
Predictors
WOFO competitiveness -,058 -,297** -,047 1,4 % 0,2 % -,168 -,086 -,136 0,1 % 1,9 %
WOFO work-mastery -,015 -,339*** -,012 1,8 % 0,0 % ,226* ,620*** ,191* 6,1 % 3,7 %
AGQ performance approach ,018 -,156 ,014 0,3 % 0,0 % ,009 ,166 ,007 0,4 % 0,0 %
AGQ mastery avoidance -,406** -,942*** -,304** 14,1 % 9,3 % ,193 ,686*** ,146 7,5 % 2,1 %
AGQ mastery approach -,085 -,574*** -,062 5,2 % 0,4 % ,234* ,754*** ,172* 9,0 % 3,0 %
AGQ performance avoidance ,040 -,251** ,033 1,0 % 0,1 % ,124 ,306** ,101 1,5 % 1,0 %
Condition ,090 ,258** ,089 1,1 % 0,8 % -,043 -,150 -,042 0,4 % 0,2 %
Note. 





Regression coefficients for individual predictors in the need-for achievement hypothesis
* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001
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mastery if participants got an A on their exam. AGQ performance approach was completely 
unrelated to forecasts in both scenarios. 
The Focalism Hypothesis 
Analyses did not provide consistent evidence that the manipulation led to more or less 
intense forecasted (un)happiness, and showed that the manipulation did not affect attentional 
focus.  
Results of the Mann-Whitney U-tests indicated that the manipulation check did not 
differ between the focalism and control group in either scenario, and that participants in the 
two conditions reported that they would spend an equivalent amount of time thinking about 
their grade (see Table 2). Multiple regression indicated a small effect of the manipulation on 
forecasted unhappiness in the event of receiving a failing grade. The positive correlation 
indicates that forecasts were less intense for participants in the focalism condition. The 
regression in the A-scenario did not indicate any effect of the manipulation on forecasts7 (see 
Table 1). Results of regression thus supported the construal-level hypothesis in the F-




                                                 
7 Nonparametric supplemental tests supported this finding, see Appendix D. 
Variable Mdn. U r
Explained 




Focusing 10,0 1217,0 -,016 2,50 % 9,0 1285,5 -,010 1,00 %
Control 10,0 - - - 9,5 - - -
Note.
Table 2
Whitney-Mann U-test of the manipulation check
F-scenario A-scenario
p  < .090
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The Moderation Hypothesis 
Results indicated that individual differences in achievement goals did not moderate 
the effect of the manipulation. As analysis regarding the manipulation check indicated no 
attentional effect, this was not directly contrary to the moderation hypothesis. 
After excluding two outliers in the F-scenario (see Appendix B for outliers), 
moderation analyses were conducted with N = 106 in the F-scenario and N = 108 in the A-
scenario. Regressing happiness forecasts on condition, the need for achievement variables, 
and their interaction term revealed no significant interactions for any of the need for 
achievement variables in neither the F-scenario nor the A-scenario (all p > .101). In the A-
scenario, including age significantly increased predictive power in the moderated regression 
for AGQ performance approach (R2 change = .056, p = .014) and AGQ mastery approach (R2 
change = .045, p = .017), but this disappeared when subsequently controlling for gender and 
course (p > .214). Controlling for demographic factors did not significantly affect any other 
analyses in either scenario (all other R2 change p < .053). Several assumptions for regression 
were markedly violated, and the reader must therefore interpret all results with caution, 
especially in the A-scenario (see Appendix C for violated assumptions). 
Discussion 
This study attempted to answer whether individual differences in achievement goals 
could be related to how intensely people believe they will react when receiving exam results. 
The results supported our hypothesis that mastery needs, but not performance needs would 
predict the intensity of forecasted (un)happiness. Specifically, individuals with high (vs. low) 
mastery needs predicted they would react more intensely to getting both an A and an F. The 
study also attempted to experimentally manipulate attentional focus, and we made three 
specific predictions based on whether forecasts became more extreme (supporting the 
distraction hypothesis), stayed the same (supporting the interference hypothesis), or less 
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extreme (supporting the construal-level hypothesis). Results were inconclusive. Finally, we 
addressed whether people with higher achievement needs would be more sensitive to the 
attention manipulation. Our hypothesis that need for achievement would moderate the effect 
of the manipulation was not supported, possibly due to the fact the manipulation did not 
affect attentional focus as intended. 
The remainder of this article will first discuss possible interpretations of the results for 
each hypothesis. We then go on to discuss theoretical and statistical limitations regarding the 
present study. 
The Need for Achievement Hypothesis 
Of our three hypotheses, our findings could provide the most unambiguous support 
for the need for achievement hypothesis. Consistent with our hypothesis, mastery needs, but 
not performance needs, predicted the intensity of forecasted happiness in response to a top 
grade, and the intensity of forecasted unhappiness in response a very poor grade. Those who 
scored highly on mastery needs forecasted more intense emotional reactions, while those 
lower in mastery needs had more moderate forecasts. This provides tentative support to the 
proposition that the impact bias could have an adaptive function. If adaptive, forecasts should 
be influenced by people’s motivational goals, and increase motivation to either achieve or 
avoid forecasted events.  
Mastery. We found that mastery needs consistently predicted happiness forecasts. 
Participants who reported that they were anxious about not learning all that they could (AGQ 
mastery avoidance) predicted that they would feel unhappier if they failed the exam, possibly 
because their anxiety would then be confirmed. Participants who claimed to like hard work 
(WOFO work-mastery) and wanted to learn as much as possible (AGQ mastery approach), as 
well as being anxious about not learning (AGQ mastery avoidance) believed they would feel 
more intense happiness if they got an A. We suggest that this increased anticipation of 
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emotional intensity might lead these individuals to experience more motivation, which in turn 
will lead to increased effort to achieve or prevent the forecasted event.  
A natural next step would be to investigate whether those who score highly on 
mastery needs are more or less biased in their forecasts. As we did not measure how people 
actually felt when they received their grades, we cannot rule out that people with higher 
mastery needs are entirely accurate in their predictions. However, previous research has 
demonstrated that forecasts for exam grades are indeed biased (Buehler & McFarland, 2001), 
but we cannot be sure that this holds true for the particular students with high mastery needs. 
For instance, how much a task is valued has previously been associated with less biased 
forecasts, but biased forecasts have also been associated with greater success at the same 
tasks (Hoover, 2012). One interpretation is that an overestimation of the impact of future 
exam grades may lead to more effortful work, which in turn could lead to more academic 
success. To examine this in a real-world setting, one could examine whether those with more 
intense forecasts actually spend more time studying for an exam or use more effortful 
strategies, and whether their forecasts are in fact biased. 
People may feel a stronger need for mastery precisely because they believe learning 
will have a substantial impact on their happiness. Having high mastery needs mean being 
focused on achieving proficiency in academic settings (Elliot & McGregor, 2001). For 
mastery oriented students, the grade may be a proxy for their actual goal, i.e. mastering the 
subject matter, or not having their anxieties confirmed. Highly mastery oriented students may 
then expect to be rewarded with happy feelings if they get an A, or the lack of unhappy 
feelings if they avoid failing, and therefore work hard to achieve it. Our own high-mastery 
participants also explicitly confirmed liking hard work. Research has demonstrated that 
people indeed do work harder the happier they believe the goal will make them (Morewedge 
& Buechel, 2013), and that mastery needs are likewise associated with effort (Fisher & Ford, 
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1998). Mastery needs have also been associated with experiencing more satisfaction after 
expending effort, even when a goal is not accomplished (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
Consequently, it seems reasonable that the connection between mastery needs and academic 
achievement could be explained by more extreme forecasts of happiness leading to more 
effortful work. Whether this actually is the case is an empirical question. 
Performance. The need to perform or compete with others was not a substantial 
predictor of forecasted (un)happiness in the present study, in line with the need for 
achievement hypothesis. Performance avoidance, i.e. the need to avoid doing more poorly 
than others, was only weakly associated with forecasts. Second, performance approach, i.e. 
the need to do better than others, was completely unrelated to forecasts in both scenarios. 
This may explain previous findings of limited correlations between performance needs and 
academic success, as effort is not increased because performance-oriented people do not 
expect to be rewarded by happy feelings. 
However, an exam grade may only be emotionally meaningful for performance 
oriented students when it can be compared to other people's results. The scenario in the 
present study did not mention grades received by others, meaning it was not possible for 
participants to make this comparison. The dimension of mastery may instead have been the 
main focus for our participants when they simulated the scenario. A way to test this 
explanation in future studies would be to conduct a similar experiment, and adding a 
condition where the scenario also included a description of results achieved by others to 
foster social comparison. 
Yet another possibility is that students with high performance needs may have 
“conceded defeat” earlier in the semester, while mastery focused students were still focused 
on mastering the subject. Performance-orientation has been associated with perceiving effort 
as a sign of low ability, even if effort leads to success (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The 
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expending of effort alone may therefore lead to feelings of unhappiness for performance-
oriented individuals (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The level of required effort for the level of 
anticipated success could then possibly determine the level of predicted happiness. For our 
participants, this could mean that it is not the exam result that is most important for 
forecasted happiness, but rather how much effort participants expect to have to expend to get 
there. To determine if this is indeed the case, one could ask participants how much effort they 
believe they need to put forth each scenario. 
Approach and avoidance. As a part of the need for achievement hypothesis, we 
expected avoidance motivations to be more highly associated with forecasts for receiving an 
F, and approach motivations to be more highly associated for receiving an A. However, both 
AGQ mastery avoidance and AGQ performance avoidance significantly predicted forecasts 
in both scenarios. As there was intercorrelation between AGQ subscales (see Appendix A for 
intercorrelations), this may simply be due to common method variance (Drost, 2011). As 
neither avoidance variable had a significant unique contribution in the A-scenario, the 
significant correlations do not necessarily contradict our initial assumptions: While 
approachers work hard to achieve their envisioned result, avoiders put their work into 
preventing the result they have imagined for themselves if they fail. 
The Focalism Hypothesis 
The manipulation in the focalism condition used valence-neutral, low-level construal 
language, with event-consistent content: cues related to school, exams, and studying. It was 
administered through a text to be read, which was assumed to tax working memory less than 
actively generating content. The focalism hypothesis had three stipulations, depending on 
how the manipulation affected forecasts. Statistical analyses of the manipulation check 
indicated that our manipulation did not successfully focus attention in either scenario. We did 
not find a significant association between the manipulation and the intensity of forecasted 
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happiness for a top grade, which corresponds with our expectation that the A-scenario would 
exhibit a smaller effect than the F-scenario. However, this finding is also in linewith the 
interference hypothesis, which states that working memory depletion causes bias reduction. 
However, when imagining a failing grade, results indicated that the manipulation seemed to 
have a very slight defocusing effect. Our results in the F-scenario may thus be compatible 
with the construal-level hypothesis, which claims that encouraging low-level construal 
thinking will cause bias reduction.  
Distraction, interference, or construal level? Though the manipulation was 
intended to focus attention on the exam grade, it may instead have inadvertently defocused it. 
For example, it involved a description of sitting in the cafeteria with fellow students, which 
may have caused participants to remember the potential distractive or pro-coping effect of 
social interactions. Our findings would then tentatively support the distraction hypothesis, 
which states that bias reduction is caused by remembering events that will distract you from 
the focal event. However, analyses of the manipulation check indicated that participants in 
the focalism condition were just as focused on their grade as were control participants. An 
important difference between our study and previous studies on the impact bias is that we 
attempted to increase bias, whereas other researchers have focused on decreasing it. Perhaps 
it is not possible to increase the impact bias at all, or perhaps the features of our manipulation 
were not consistent enough to produce an increase in bias. 
According to the interference hypothesis, focusing manipulations should only lead to 
reduced forecasts if they tax working memory. Results in the A-scenario showed no effect of 
the manipulation, which supports the interference hypothesis. However, our participants still 
experienced a slight defocusing effect in the F-scenario. It is unlikely that taxation of working 
memory in itself produced the defocusing effect we found, and the lack of an effect in the A-
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scenario may simply be due to unmet statistical assumptions and insensitive supplemental 
tests.  
The manipulation may have encouraged an increased focus on the details and context 
of the event, rather than the superordinate features, supporting the construal-level hypothesis. 
If construal level was responsible for the defocusing, this may also explain why the 
manipulation check did not detect a change in attentional focus.  
Our findings with regard to focalism should be interpreted with caution, and can 
perhaps best be seen as a starting point for further exploration. If both construal level and 
distraction plays an equal role in the established defocusing effect, our participants might 
have been equally influenced by either one, which would result in them cancelling each other 
out. 
One way to follow up these results and test the three hypotheses more explicitly 
would be an experiment with a 2x2x2 design, where manipulations differ on level of working 
memory taxation, construal level, and whether cues are event consistent or inconsistent. This 
would enable us to test the interference hypothesis, the construal-level hypothesis, and the 
distraction hypothesis respectively. It is possible that different explanatory models apply to 
the impact bias for positive and negative events e.g. that working memory depletion affected 
one and construal level the other. It is also possible that different explanations apply to the 
bias in forecasted intensity and duration. This could be detected through this experimental 
design provided researchers include measures of both, and a negative and positive scenario. 
The Moderation Hypothesis 
Finally, no moderation effect was found between need for achievement measures and 
the manipulation. We hypothesized that participants high in need for achievement would be 
more sensitive to the manipulation if the manipulation affected attentional focus. As 
attentional focus was shown to be unaffected, the lack of moderation effect was not 
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surprising. Unfortunately, unmet assumptions in the moderated regressions mean that the 
validity of the results is highly questionable, and we cannot rule out that a moderation does 
exist despite our nonsignificant findings. Due to range restriction and the nonexistent 
attentional effect of the manipulation, it was judged improbable that less sensitive 
nonparametric analyses of moderation would supply more definitive answers.  
Limitations 
Theoretical limitations. There were a number of theoretical limitations present in the 
study. First, due to time constraints, we were not able to perform a pilot study to assess the 
reliability and validity or of our translated measures against the original wordings. The 
Norwegian translations could possibly be more unreliable and measure a slightly different 
construct than the original measures. Second, because it was immediately preceded by the F-
scenario, a contrast effect may have affected responses in the A-scenario (Schwarz & Bless, 
1992). The prospect of receiving an A may have functioned as a comfort after imagining 
failing their exam, causing relief and happiness. This may have inflated happiness forecasts 
in the A-scenario for the entire sample. Ideally, the order of the scenarios would have been 
counterbalanced for half the participants, though this would have required a larger sample. 
Third, using a unidimensional measure may be a methodological weakness common to the 
field, as unhappiness and happiness does not appear to be opposite anchors on the same scale, 
but vary independently (Fordyce, 1988; Hahnemann & Krueger, 2006). When forced to 
merge them into a single response, participants may have given answers that did not 
accurately represent their forecasts. Fourth, the sample itself limits the interpretability of our 
results. Students were asked to predict their affective reactions in response to different exams. 
They might have had divergent expectations about the probability of achieving a high or low 
grade, and expectations have been shown to play a major role in motivation (Eccles & 
Wigfield, 2002; Hoover, 2012). However, these differences would likely be equally 
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distributed across conditions. Fifth, the sampled study programs are highly competitive, and 
students must have a high GPA from high school to gain admittance (Samordna opptak, 
2015). The fact that our sample is fairly homogenous in terms of levels of academic 
attainment means that results may not be generalizable to a general student population. 
Statistical limitations. The present study also had two major statistical limitations: 
the use of single-item measures, and restriction of range. Single-item measures, used in the 
present study to measure happiness forecasts, have been shown to have several 
methodological weaknesses (Gliem & Gliem, 2003), but are nevertheless frequently used in 
the literature (e.g. Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2012; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013; 
Wilson et al., 2000). This means that even though our study is vulnerable to these 
weaknesses, it is not more so than the majority of studies in the field. For an example of a 
validated single-item measure of happiness forecasting, see Fordyce (1988). 
 A number of the central variables in the current study appeared to be markedly range 
restricted (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of a range restricted measure. 
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This restriction may mean that we are missing a substantial amount of the variation 
that is present in the population (Sackett & Yang, 2000). When range restriction is caused by 
measurement issues and not sampling, it may also distort the visible distribution. The portion 
of the distribution beyond the reach of the measure is not excluded from the sample, but 
merely stacked at the closest available response alternative. Responses may then be 
artificially compressed at the end-point of the scale, meaning the visible distribution does not 
reflect the shape of the actual distribution within the sample itself. Standard deviation and 
variance would be similarly distorted. Artificial compression of results would therefore mean 
that the results of any statistical methods using standard deviation or variance in calculations, 
or that compare the size or shape of distributions, might be inaccurate (Sackett & Yang, 
2000). Even mildly range restricted predictor variables in regression reduces the validity of 
results (Aguinis, 1995), and the regression results in the present study must therefore be 
cautiously interpreted even when statistical assumptions are met. However, forecasts may 
simply not be normally distributed in the population, though this would also have statistical 
implications (Micceri, 1989). 
We could not find explicit information about range restriction in the affective 
forecasting literature. However, when performing a cursory investigation of means and 
standard deviations, signs of marked and mild range restriction for at least one forecasting 
variable appeared in all the studies we examined (e.g. Gilbert et al., 1998; Lench, Safer, & 
Levine, 2011; Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005).  
Thus, the present study may not be the only one in the field with questionable 
conclusion validity (Drost, 2011; Mentzer & Flint, 1997). The fact that the varied affective 
forecasting literature has found consistent evidence of impact bias despite range restriction 
and single-item measures supports the validity of the results. Forecasts may not be normally 
distributed, but if they are, measures need to be developed that capture the entire range of the 
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population distribution. It is encouraging that not all forecast-variables we examined in the 
literature were restricted, as this indicates that creating such a measure should be possible.  
Concluding Remarks 
In spite of limitations, we reason that our findings are not purely an illusion caused by 
measurement issues or unmet assumptions, though the picture may be incomplete. The results 
suggest a positive relationship between achievement needs/motivation and the intensity of 
forecasted of emotion, contributing both to the personality literature on individual differences 
as well as the social psychology literature on affective forecasting. In sum, our findings 
suggest a definite connection between mastery needs and affective forecasting. We argue that 
this supports the notion that impact bias serves an adaptive motivational purpose, and that it 
may cause increased effort and subsequent higher academic achievement for people high in 
mastery needs. Further research on the relationship between need for achievement and 
affective forecasts might shed light on both the adaptive function of the biased predictions of 
emotional reactions, and the cognitive components of mastery needs. 
Our result indicated support for both the interference hypothesis and the construal-
level hypothesis of focalism. However, restriction of range may have masked the effect of the 
manipulation. More research is needed to better understand focalism, preferably using 
validated measures without restriction of range. 
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The Need for Achievement Measures 
Both the WOFO and AGQ were translated from English to Norwegian. To ensure that 
the translation was unambiguous and reliable, they were first translated by one researcher, 
and then translated back to English by an independent researcher who was not familiar with 
the original measures. “Coworkers” was changed to “fellow students” during translation of 
the WOFO to make the questions more applicable to our sample. The two questions deleted 
from the WOFO work-mastery scale were “It is important to me to do my work as well as I 
can even if it isn’t popular with my coworkers” and “I would rather learn easy, fun games, 
than difficult, thought games” (Spence & Helmreich, 1983, p. 42). 
Whether Likert-scales should be defined as ordinal or scale variables is a contentious 
issue (Boone & Boone, 2012; Carifio & Perla, 2008; Jamieson, 2004; Kuzon Jr, Urbanchek, 
& McCabe, 1996; Norman, 2010). As the WOFO-scales both consist of four or more Likert-
items, we have chosen to treat these as scale. The AGQ subscales, consisting of only three 
items each, have also been treated as scale, against statistical recommendations (Boone & 
Boone, 2012), but consistent with the literature (Elliot & McGregor, 2001). 
Previous research has found α of .69-.78 for original wording of WOFO 
competitiveness, and .81 for WOFO work-mastery (de Bruin et al., 2014; Elliot & McGregor, 
2001). α for the original wording of the AGQ have also been relatively consistent 
(performance approach .84-.94, mastery avoidance .74-.88, mastery approach .71-.89, 
performance avoidance .70-.90 [Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Ganesan, Bt Mamat, Mellor, 
Rizzuto, & Kolar, 2014; Li, 2013; Van Mierlo & Van Hooft, 2015]). Marked (de Bruin et al., 
                                                 
8 This and subsequent apendices are intended for online publication as supporting information, in line with EJSP 
guidelines. 
AFFECTIVE FORECASTING AND NEED FOR ACHIEVEMENT 
 
43 
2014) and mild (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Ganesan et al., 2014; Li, 2013) restriction of 
range are also indicated in previous studies using the measures. 
Small to large correlations have been found between subscales within each framework 
(Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Ganesan et al., 2014; Li, 2013; Van Mierlo & Van Hooft, 2015) 
suggesting both measures suffer from common method variance (Drost, 2011).  
One previous study compared the two frameworks, and found correlations between 
AGQ mastery approach and WOFO work-mastery (r = .29), as well as between AGQ 
performance approach and WOFO competitiveness (r = .57). This supports the convergent 
validity of the two frameworks (Elliot & McGregor, 2001).  
Previous studies have investigated the discriminant validity of the original translations 
of the AGQ using confirmatory factor analysis (Van Mierlo & Van Hooft, 2015), but this was 
not possible within the time frame of the current study. Instead, we used the correction for 
attenuation formula as a measure of discriminant validity, and assessed convergent validity 
by using nonparametric correlation analyses. Results below .85 indicated acceptable 
discriminant validity (Carmines & Zeller, 1979), and correlations above .50 indicated 
acceptable convergent validity (Carlson & Herdman, 2012). See Table 3 for validity results. 
 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. WOFO competitiveness - ,516*** -,065 ,270** ,096 ,155
2. AGQ performance approach ,742 - ,034 ,233* ,265** ,072
3. AGQ performance avoidance ,440 ,424 - -,136 -,122 ,430***
4. WOFO work-mastery ,543 ,491 ,372 - ,457*** ,165
5. AGQ mastery approach ,554 ,644 ,287 ,665 - ,364***
6. AGQ mastery avoidance ,555 ,458 ,710 ,470 ,662 -
Note. 
* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001
Table 3
Covergent and discriminant validity of the need for achievement measures
Convergent validity is printed above the diagonal and discriminant validity below.
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A large correlation was found between AGQ performance approach and WOFO 
competitiveness. A below-threshold correlation was found between AGQ mastery approach 
and WOFO work-mastery. In line with previous findings, AGQ mastery avoidance and AGQ 
performance avoidance were uncorrelated with the WOFO subscales, indicating that they 
measured separate constructs. All subscales were discriminately valid, including those 
thought to be measures of the same underlying construct. In sum, all the translated subscales 
appeared to measure distinct, though interrelated constructs. 
  





The threshold for outliers was set at 3 standard deviations from the mean, and 
studentized deleted residuals were saved for each case during regression. An outlier was 
more closely inspected if the value of the studentized deleted residuals exceeded ±1.96. Once 
an outlier was identified, the decision whether to exclude or keep the outlier was made based 
on examination of the actual versus the statistically expected forecasts (Viechtbauer & 
Cheung, 2010). The original questionnaire was examined to ensure outliers were not a result 
of coding errors. When conducting multiple regression in the F-scenario, two outliers were 
identified. After examining the actual and expected responses it was judged probable that 
these responses were made in error due to participants mentally reversing the scale. They 
were therefore excluded from analysis. One outlier was also identified in the A-scenario. 
There was no reason to believe the response, 5, was made in error, as several other 
participants gave the same score and it was at the midpoint of the scale. It was therefore 
decided not to exclude the outlier, and analysis was run with and without it. The same 
outliers identified for the previous regression in the F-scenario were also identified for all 
moderated regressions in the F-scenario, and excluded. Four outliers were identified for 
moderated regressions in the A-scenario, all had given a forecast score of 5. It was not 
believed that the response was erroneous, and so analysis was conducted both with and 
without the outliers. Our reported results were from analyses including all outliers in the A-
scenario, as excluding them did not meaningfully influence assumptions or results. 
Missing Data 
Five participants had missing values on one or more of the variables, due to skipping 
a page or a question. These were corrected for with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
Fully Conditional Specification (FCS) imputation method with predictive mean matching. 
AFFECTIVE FORECASTING AND NEED FOR ACHIEVEMENT 
 
46 
This is considered best practice in the treatment of missing values (de Bruin, Kok, Leppink, 
& Camp, 2014). Two completed datasets were generated, and missing values were replaced 
with the average imputed value across the two datasets. An exception was made for the 
manipulation check in the A-scenario, where this value exceeded the possible maximum 
value of the measure. The maximum value was used instead. 
  





See Table 4 for descriptive statistics and normality tests for major study variables9. 
For multiple regression and moderated regression, normality was examined using 
Shapiro-Wilk on the studentized residuals, as well as inspection of residual histograms, p-p 
plots, and q-q plots. Autocorrelation was assessed using the Durbin-Watson test. Linearity 
was examined through visual inspection of scatterplots with added loess-lines (α = 65 %): a 
scatterplot of studentized residuals against predicted values, as well as all partial regression 
plots. Homoscedasticity was determined using the Koenker test (Koenker & Bassett Jr, 
1982), and multicollinearity by examining the Tolerance/VIF values (Cohen et al., 2013). For 
Kruskal-Wallis H-tests, similarity of distribution was assessed through visual inspection of 
box-plots. In the case of dissimilar distributions, variables were ranked and tested for 
homoscedasticity using the Koenker test (Ruxton & Beauchamp, 2008). For Mann-Whitney 
U-tests, the stochastic equality of distributions was assessed through visual inspection of 
histograms (Nachar, 2008). Measuring the dependent variables with a single Likert-item 
means the dependent variables are technically ordinal, but they are usually treated as scale in 
the literature. We have chosen to treat them as scale for the purpose of regression (otherwise 
ordinal). 
Need for achievement and focalism hypotheses. All assumptions for multiple 
regression were met in the F-scenario. In the A-scenario, the distribution of residuals was 
significantly non-normal and plots also indicated a distinctly skewed distribution. The 
parameter estimates and confidence intervals used in the model are therefore questionable, 
                                                 
9 Median and mode were calculated in addition to mean and SD to assess the central tendency of nonnormal 
variables. 
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and conclusion validity reduced. In addition, the assumption of homoscedasticity was not met 
(p = .004), which further invalidates the confidence intervals10.  
We supplemented our analysis in the A-scenario with nonparametric tests. The need 
for achievement hypothesis was examined using the Kruskal-Wallis H-test, a nonparametric 
test of variance. The Kruskal-Wallis tested the hypothesis from the opposite direction of OLS 
regression, with the need for achievement variables as test variables, and happiness forecasts 
as grouping variable. We could then determine whether someone with a high score on a need 
for achievement measure made more intense forecast (OLS regression), and conversely 
whether someone with more intense forecast had higher scores on need for achievement 
measures (Kruskal-Wallis). The focalism-hypothesis was examined using Mann-Whitney U-
test, a nonparametric alternative to the t-test, using forecasts as test variable and condition as 
grouping variable (see Appendix D for results).  
For Kruskal-Wallis H-tests, the need for achievement scores were not similarly 
distributed across all values of forecasts in either scenario, but the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was fulfilled (all p > .259). The test was therefore used to examine 
differences in mean ranks rather than medians. All assumptions for all Mann-Whitney U-tests 
were met.  
Moderation hypothesis. In the F-scenario, the normality assumption was fulfilled only when 
regressing forecasts on AGQ mastery avoidance, condition, and interaction term. All other 
regressions suffered from non-normal residual-distributions. Normality plots indicated a 
multimodal distribution in the WOFO competitiveness and AGQ performance avoidance 
regressions, and no specific pattern for the others (see Table 5). The main scatterplots 
indicated linear relationships between predictors and forecasts, but partial regression plots  
  
                                                 
10 When repeating the regression without the outlier, the assumptions remained unmet. 
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Variable M SD Min. Max. Median Mode
Shapiro 
Wilk Skew. Kurt. 
Forecasts F 1,750 1,624 ,00 10,00 2,00 ,00 ,844*** 1,654 5,612
Forecasts A 9,093 1,342 5,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 ,714*** -1,553 1,736
WOFO work-mastery 5,262 ,646 3,33 6,67 ,990 -,283 -,018
WOFO competitiveness 4,443 1,373 1,40 7,00 ,978 -,252 -,687
AGQ Performance approach 4,176 1,527 1,00 7,00 4,00 4,00 ,962** -,088 -,583
AGQ Mastery avoidance 4,891 1,639 1,00 7,00 5,17 6,00 ,973* -,447 -,913
AGQ Mastery approach 6,148 ,859 3,67 7,00 6,33 7,00 ,931*** -1,020 ,383
AGQ Performance avoidance 3,630 1,668 1,00 7,00 3,33 3,33 ,868*** ,167 -,954
Manipulation check F 9,278 1,222 2,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 ,630*** -2,838 11,995
Manipulation check A 8,667 1,680 2,00 10,00 9,00 10,00 ,784*** -1,446 2,338
Note. 
Skewness and kurtosis values in bold were above the cutoff when divided by their standard error. 
* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001
Table 4
Descriptives and normality tests





indicated nonlinear partial relationships between all need for achievement variables and 
happiness forecasts. 
None of the regressions in the A-scenario fulfilled the normality assumption, and all 
plots indicated that the residuals in all regressions were heavily skewed and kurtotic (see 
Table 5). The main scatterplots indicated linear relationships between predictors and 
forecasts, but partial regression plots indicated nonlinear partial relationships between 
forecasts and all need for achievement variables. Assumptions remained unmet when outliers 






,977 ,389 -,085 ,933*** -1,013 ,987
,949*** ,544 -,386 ,808*** -1,516 1,716
,958** ,502 -,479 ,862*** -1,327 1,180
,951** ,556 -,489 ,799*** -1,465 1,535
,982 ,345 -,071 ,873*** -1,385 1,713
,968* ,512 -,366 ,896*** -1,214 1,310







Skewness and kurtosis values in bold were above the cutoff when divided by their 
standard error. 












Nonparametric Supplemental Tests 
Kruskal Wallis H test examined the need for achievement hypothesis in the opposite 
direction from the regressions, and supported the regression result (see Table 6). Effect size 




See Table 7 for mean ranks across forecasts in the F-scenario. There was an 
observable general trend for the participants with lower forecasts to have higher scores on 
AGQ mastery avoidance. See Table 8 for mean ranks across forecasts in the A-scenario. 
Three general trends were observed, where participants with higher forecasts had higher 
scores on AGQ mastery approach, AGQ mastery avoidance, and WOFO work-mastery than 
those whose forecasts are more middling. There were other trends apparent in the 
distributions of the mean ranks in both scenarios, but these were not statistically significant.  
Table 6
Kruskal-Wallis H-test of the need for achievement hypothesis
Variable χ2 df η2
Explained 
variance
WOFO competitiveness 4,084 5 ,038 3,8 %
WOFO work-mastery 11,123* 5 ,104* 10,4 %
AGQ performance approach 2,157 5 ,020 2,0 %
AGQ mastery avoidance 14,813* 5 ,138* 13,8 %
AGQ mastery approach 11,722* 5 ,110* 11,0 %
AGQ performance avoidance 5,647 5 ,053 5,3 %
Note. 
* p  < .05, *** p  < .001
A-scenario
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Mann-Whitney U-test was used to supplement regression for the focalism hypothesis 
in the A-scenario. Results indicated that forecasts were equivalent between conditions in both 




0 1 2 3 4 5 7 10
63,3 50,9 59,3 43,9 47,3 69,8 23,0 16,5
62,6 51,8 51,9 53,4 48,5 30,0 94,0 49,5
59,5 51,0 55,9 53,2 58,1 34,5 14,5 41,0
73,6 52,4 61,1 31,5 33,8 24,3 9,0 74,5
69,2 54,0 49,1 46,9 42,0 38,0 92,5 39,5
58,4 55,7 61,5 36,8 59,6 48,8 4,5 50,5
Note.




Kruskal-Wallis H-test mean ranks across responses to "How happy would you be that day" in 
the F-scenario
AGQ performance avoidance
1 = "very unhappy", 10 = "very happy". 






5 6 7 8 9 10
81,8 41,2 47,9 50,9 54,8 54,9
20,1 37,7 40,6 47,3 51,5 61,6
60,0 45,5 39,5 56,1 54,4 55,9
26,5 39,3 41,6 36,3 52,4 63,2
26,5 22,0 38,6 48,7 54,8 60,9
55,3 34,2 52,8 41,1 51,4 59,5
1 = "very unhappy", 10 = "very happy". 
No participants gave scores lower than 5.
Significant variables in bold.
Variables
Forecasts
Kruskal-Wallis H-test mean ranks across responses to "How happy would 














Whitney-Mann U-test of the focalism hypothesis




    Focusing 9,0 1285,500 -,010 1,00 %
    Control 9,5 - - -
Note.
A-scenario
p  = .350





 The final pages of the PDF contain the questionnaire for the focalism condition 





































































































































































_______	stolt		 	 	 ______	redd	
	
	 	
Stopp	opp	et	øyeblikk,	og	se	for	deg	så	klart	og	levende	som	du	kan	at	du	står	i	den	
følgende	situasjonen:	
	
	
Ta	utgangspunkt	i	det	faget	som	du	nettopp	har	hatt	forelesning	i,	og	tenk	to	måneder	frem	i	tid	
til	sensuren	er	klar.	Se	for	deg	at	det	har	gått	så	dårlig	på	eksamen	at	du	får	karakteren	F.	
	
Du	er	på	lesesalen	mellom	to	forelesninger	når	du	finner	ut	hvilken	karakter	du	har	fått.	Du	
sjekker	karakteren	din	fordi	flere	av	medstudentene	som	du	møter	i	lunsjen	diskuterer	hvordan	
det	gikk	på	akkurat	denne	eksamenen,	og	sier	at	resultatene	sikkert	blir	lagt	ut	snart.	Det	neste	
som	skjer	etter	at	du	har	sjekket	karakteren	din	er	at	du	må	gå	tilbake	til	auditoriet	for	å	rekke	
neste	forelesning.	Etter	denne	forelesningen	er	ferdig	har	du	avtalt	eksamenskollokvie	i	et	annet	
fag,	slik	at	du	må	bli	på	skolen	i	noen	timer	til	før	du	kan	gå	hjem.		
	
	
Dersom	dette	skjedde	deg:	
	
Hvor	mye	ville	du	tenkt	på	eksamenskarakteren	din	den	dagen?	
Tenkt	svært	lite																																																																																	Tenkt	svært	mye	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	
	
Hvor	lykkelig	ville	du	følt	deg	den	dagen?		
Svært	ulykkelig																																																																																							Svært	lykkelig	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	 	
Stopp	opp	et	øyeblikk,	og	se	for	deg	så	klart	og	levende	som	du	kan	at	du	står	i	den	
følgende	situasjonen:	
	
	
Ta	utgangspunkt	i	det	faget	som	du	nettopp	har	hatt	forelesning	i,	og	tenk	to	måneder	frem	i	tid	
til	sensuren	er	klar.	Se	for	deg	at	det	har	gått	så	dårlig	på	eksamen	at	du	får	karakteren	F.	
	
Du	er	på	lesesalen	mellom	to	forelesninger	når	du	finner	ut	hvilken	karakter	du	har	fått.	Du	
sjekker	karakteren	din	fordi	flere	av	medstudentene	som	du	møter	i	lunsjen	diskuterer	hvordan	
det	gikk	på	akkurat	denne	eksamenen,	og	sier	at	resultatene	sikkert	blir	lagt	ut	snart.	Det	neste	
som	skjer	etter	at	du	har	sjekket	karakteren	din	er	at	du	må	gå	tilbake	til	auditoriet	for	å	rekke	
neste	forelesning.	Etter	denne	forelesningen	er	ferdig	har	du	avtalt	eksamenskollokvie	i	et	annet	
fag,	slik	at	du	må	bli	på	skolen	i	noen	timer	til	før	du	kan	gå	hjem.		
	
	
Dersom	dette	skjedde	deg:	
	
	
I	hvor	lang	tid	etterpå	ville	eksamenskarakteren	påvirket	lykkefølelsen	din?	
Ingen	tid																																																																																																		Svært	lang	tid	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	
	
Hvor	lang	tid	ville	det	tatt	før	eksamenskarakteren	ikke	lenger	ville	hatt	noen	betydning	for	
lykkefølelsen	din?	
	
___	Måneder,	___	Uker,	___	Dager,	___	Timer				
	 	
Stopp	opp	et	øyeblikk,	og	se	for	deg	så	klart	og	levende	som	du	kan	at	du	står	i	den	
følgende	situasjonen:	
	
	
Ta	utgangspunkt	i	det	faget	som	du	nettopp	har	hatt	forelesning	i,	og	tenk	to	måneder	frem	i	tid	
til	sensuren	er	klar.	Se	for	deg	at	det	har	gått	så	bra	på	eksamen	at	du	får	karakteren	A.	
	
	
Dersom	dette	skjedde	deg:	
	
Hvor	mye	ville	du	tenkt	på	eksamenskarakteren	din	den	dagen?	
Tenkt	svært	lite																																																																																	Tenkt	svært	mye	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	
	
Hvor	lykkelig	ville	du	følt	deg	den	dagen?		
Svært	ulykkelig																																																																																							Svært	lykkelig	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	 	
Stopp	opp	et	øyeblikk,	og	se	for	deg	så	klart	og	levende	som	du	kan	at	du	står	i	den	
følgende	situasjonen:	
	
	
Ta	utgangspunkt	i	det	faget	som	du	nettopp	har	hatt	forelesning	i,	og	tenk	to	måneder	frem	i	tid	
til	sensuren	er	klar.	Se	for	deg	at	det	har	gått	så	bra	på	eksamen	at	du	får	karakteren	A.	
	
	
Dersom	dette	skjedde	deg:	
	
	
I	hvor	lang	tid	etterpå	ville	eksamenskarakteren	påvirket	lykkefølelsen	din?	
Ingen	tid																																																																																																		Svært	lang	tid	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	
	
Hvor	lang	tid	ville	det	tatt	før	eksamenskarakteren	ikke	lenger	ville	hatt	noen	betydning	for	
lykkefølelsen	din?	
	
___	Måneder,	___	Uker,	___	Dager,	___	Timer			(fyll	ut)				
	 	
I	det	faget	som	du	nettopp	har	hatt	forelesning	i:	
	
	
Hvor	stor	arbeidsinnsats	er	du	villig	til	å	legge	ned	i	eksamensforberedelsene	dine,	fra	i	dag	og	
frem	til	eksamensdagen?	
	
Ingen	innsats																																																																																			Svært	stor	innsats	
0										1										2										3										4										5										6										7										8										9										10	
	
	
Hvor	mye	tid	per	uke	er	du	villig	til	å	bruke	på	å	forberede	deg	til	eksamen,	fra	i	dag	og	frem	til	
eksamensdagen?	
	
___	timer		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
